THE GROWTH IN PENNSYLVANIA OF THE
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN.*
In the extremely brief space permitted this paper on such
a broad subject, it will only be possible to point out the
marked contrast between existing legal conditions and what
formerly constituted the law.
At the old common law of England, from which we in this
State have drawn the substance of the principles of our law,
when a woman entered the state of matrimony, the theory
arose that her person in the eyes of the law became merged
in that of her husband's. As a consequence her property
was transferred by virtue of this legal fiction to him as
follows: he became the absolute owner of whatever personal
property was in possession of the wife, and such other personal property as bonds, notes and other choses in action; he
could acquire complete property in them by reducing them to
possession or, in other words, by taking such legal steps as
were necessary to substitute himself in his wife's position as
the holder of the legal or equitable title he acquired, under
certain conditions, what is termed his curtesy in her real
estate, the amount of this interest being a freehold estate not
of inheritance in the wife's real property; and he became
absolute master of the profits of her land during coverture.
At common law it was generally said marriage destroyed
all powers of the woman to enter into a contract, and this was
an effect also of the same theory of the destruction and
obliteration of the legal existence of a married woman.
It would seem, however, that this theory, considered from
the mere standpoint of a legal theory causing legal results to
flow from its operation, is not entirely flawless, because it
was possible for a married woman to have received a gift or
a purchase provided she had her husband's assent to the
transaction, and her choses in action remained in her legal
*This article was delivered as an address at the Commencement of the
Temple College Law School in June, Igoi, and as it was intended for
a non-professional audience it was the author's effort to make it popular
in form.
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possession until such time as the husband reduced them to
his possession; again, it was possible for a married woman
to enter into a contract, and this was not absolutely void,
though generally said to be so, but only became void at her
election, or the election of her husband when he chose to
interfere.
In connection with the last proposition, it would seem the
theory suggested, obiter dictum, by Mr. Justice Woodward,
and also by other jurists and legal authorities, that a married
woman is in law supposed to be sub potestate viri and therefore incapable of making a contract, is perhaps a more logical
theory so far as her making and enforcing of contracts is
concerned, though it is not generally approved.
Whether these criticisms are sound or not, the practical
results were as stated, and in substance her property and contractual rights as a single woman were almost entirely
destroyed, her legal existence for most purposes suspended.
and other legal disabilities not to be properly considered
here added to her estate when she became a married woman.
Such legal servitude was incompatible with the spirit of
the founders of the Commonwealth and their descendants,
and as was said in an opinion by Mr. Justice Agnew in 1864:
"Even before the passage of the Act of 1848, custom and the
common sense of justice had materially mitigated the rigor
of that fiction, and equity had consistently refused to recognize the logical effect of a legal unity wherever by its rank
injury it became legal folly."
Time cannot be taken in a paper of this general character
to consider the smaller ameliorations effected by liberal
judges, but only some of the larger and more important
emancipations accomplished by legislative action can be
briefly examined, without even indulging in the interesting
study of the manner in which the various Acts were
expounded and received their present construction by the
Supreme Court.
The first legislative step for this purpose was the Act of
1718, and it had in view the case of a wife left to shift for
herself where her husband had gone to sea. It provided that
such wife should have the right to trade as a feme sole, contract as such and sue or be sued without joining her husband.
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This Act had its provisions extended by the Act of 1855 to
cases of desertion by or neglect of the husband to support his
wife. But, under both Acts it was held that the wife, to
become entitled to the benefit of the provisions, should be
engaged in some trade, business or employment pursued
as a means of livelihood; and if this were not so, she could
not contract, sue or be sued under their provisions. The
scope and purpose of these Acts are evidently to ameliorate
the unfortunate condition of a woman under any of the
above recited conditions, who otherwise might not be able to
earn her living by any trade or business occupation. In this
connection we might examine the Act of 1872 which provides that the earnings of any married woman "shall accrue
to and inure to the separate benefit of said married woman"
and not be subject to any legal claim of her husband. It was
contended that this Act enabled any married woman to engage in trade or business, and by virtue of that circunitance
she became a feme sole trader, but Mr. Justice Paxson in
1882 held that the Act of 1872 only secured to her her separate earnings and that there is no feme sole trading with us
except those licensed under the Acts of 1718 and 1855. And
further, that the Act of 1872 by implication gave her the
right to engage in business, and that to the extent of her
rights and liabilities in relation to the business itself she is
to be considered a feme sole. Before this Act of 1872 and
notwithstanding the Act of 1848, to which immediate reference will be made, the earnings of a married woman on their
receipt by her became the property of her husband.
In 1848 the legislature took a long step towards freeing
married woman from their disabilities to hold their own
property; in substance it was enacted that "every species
of property which may be owned by a single woman shall
continue to be her property as fully after marriage as before
and all property which shall accrue during coverture shall be owned, used and enjoyed by such married
woman as lfer own separate estate . . . and shall not
be subject to levy and execution for her husband'sdebts
nor encumbered or conveyed by her husband without her
written consent." One might, reading these provisions, be
inclined to think that the very obvious purpose of the
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Act, after preserving her separate estate to her own use,
was to enable a married woman to do almost anything she
pleased with it. But this Act, as well as those which so far
have been adverted to, is in derogation of the common law
and therefore to be construed strictly. And when the words
are carefully analyzed and considered, no general powers are
found contained in them, but only certain special powers
given, and such has been the effect given to the Act by the
courts when appealed to. In a case where it was strongly
urged that the Act gave general powers of contract to a married woman we find such language as this denying such
proposition. First, alluding to the disabilities prior to the
Act, the court said: "And the Act of 1848 did not and was
not intended to change the law in this respect except to bind
her separate estate in special cases and in the manner therein
specified." The Act was therefore limited to its terms,
and it was held that all the Act expressly did was
to enable a married woman to own, use and enjoy her property as a married woman as if the
property had been settled to her sole and separateuse during
coverture: and that such ownership involved no contractual
powers of any kind except such as were indispensible to preserve such estate from ruin, and these rights rested upon the
theory that the privelege to own, use and enjoy gave by
implicationthe power to take care of it, and if this were not
so the privilege would be an empty one; as was said in a per
curiam opinion in 1875: "If the roof of her house be blown
off by storm or sink in utter decay so that the building
becomes untenantable, what is to become of it if she cannot
repair it." This narrow construction, however, was only
reached after considerable doubt by the profession and it
was thought by many that a more liberal one should have
been given.
Prior to the Act of 1848 the property of a married woman
could be taken in execution for the debts of her husband by
his creditors. This Act put an end to that injustice, though
it did not in any way interfere with the husband's right of
curtesy in her estate. Against this interest in his wife's
land his creditors still issued execution, but of course could
not get possession until the wife's death. To remedy this

528

GROWTH OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN.

evil the legislature in 185o enacted that the husband's interest in his wife's land shall not be subject to execution and
sale during the wife's life. This Act, however, made no mention of the lien of judgments against the husband attaching
to his interest in the wife's property. To remedy this the
legislature enacted in 1863 that the lien of no such judgment
should attach to the real estate of the wife, nor upon the husband's interest as tenant by curtesy in her property during
the lifetime of the wife.
The spirit of freedom which pervades our society had up
to this point been aiming at the mere protection of married
women, and had found expression in the legislative acts
which have been cursorily examined. But the same spirit
called for greater strides in the direction of freeing married
women from the legal trammels that marriage imposed upon
them. Mere protection had been accomplished, but had
become insufficient to satisfy the growth of public sentiment
which in innumerable ways was recognizing the legal,
economic and personal equality of men and women in the
married state. Accordinglyin 1887, an Act was passed
which was intended not merely to protect the wife's property
from the rapaciousness of her husband and his creditors, but
aimed at giving to a married woman as large property and
contractual rights as would be consistent with a proper protection, necessary for the inexperience in business affairs and
easily influenced character of her sex.
The terms of this Act were by far the most sweeping of
any of a similar kind that had been passed up to the time of
its enactment, and indicated the clear purpose of the legislature that it should be construed in the same spirit as all
prior ones of a similar kind had been, but that it was to be
an enabling and an enlarging Act, and therefore it should
receive such liberal and fair constructon as, in the words
of Judge Endlich, in his book on the interpretation of statutes, "would advance the remedy aimed at by it so long as it
does not go beyond its real object and scope." In 1891 Paxson, C. J., speaking of the Act of 1887 and of the powers
given by it to a married woman, said: "So general is her
power to contract now, that her inability is the exception
rather than the rule." These words of the Chief
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Justice were adopted by Justice Green in 1893,
and fairly represent what was the attitude of our
highest tribunal towards the Act. A few years of
working experience under the Act showed that it was
not as satisfactory as could be desired, and the profession
saw that many points had been raised and could be still
further raised, that were not fully covered by its terms.
According, in 1893 an Act was passed intended to cover the
discrepancies of the Act of 1887, accomplish in a better way
the same objects as the Act of 1887, and which by its very
terms repealed all laws inconsistent with it. The Act of
1893 gave the same powers to a married woman to acquire,
enjoy and dispose of any property as if she were an unmarried person, except she cannot convey or mortgage her real
property without the joinder of her husband. She may
make any contract, except she may not become accommodation indorser, maker, guarantor or surety for another. She
may sue and be sued as an unmarried woman, but she may
not sue her husband except under certain conditions and for
certain objects. Thus at one blow almost all the remaining
disabilities existing at common law in the case of a married
woman were swept away. The purpose of this act is well
stated by Mr. Justice Green in a case decided in 1895. He
said: "The Act of 1893 was intended to place the rights of a
married woman upon a broader, more comprehensive and
better defined basis than was accomplished by the Act of
1887." And the effect of the Act is well stated by Justice
Dean in 1895. He said: "Formerly her capacity to contract was exceptional and her disability general; now her
disability is exceptional and her capacity general."
These very words were incorporated in an opinion by
President Judge Rice, of the Superior Court, in a case decided in 1897. Together they are a good reflection of the
mind of our courts of highest jurisdiction on the meaning of
the Act of 1893 and the effect to be given to it.
The Acts of 1848, 1887 and 1893 gave with certain restrictions to married women the power to dispose of their
property by will and testament.
Of necessity it has only been possible in this paper to
notice the most important of the forty odd Acts of legisla-
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ture passed with a view to emancipate married women from
their legal disabilities.
The brief paper, which is the condensed result of considerable labor, is a good exemplification of the fact that the law
is a progressive science, and shows that as economic and
social conditions change, the law, as an integral part of the
government, also changes, to keep step with the new and constantly arising necessities of the people and the State.
Charles O'Brien.

